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The Lost Precedent of the Reverse
Doctrine of Equivalents
Samuel F. Ernst*
ABSTRACT

Proponents of legislative patent reform argue that the current
patent system perversely impedes true innovation in the name of
protecting a vast web of patented inventions, the majority of which are
never even commercialized for the benefit of the public. Opponents of
such legislation argue that comprehensive, prospective patent reform
legislation would harm the incentive to innovate more than it would
curb the vexatious practices of non-practicing entities. But while the
"InnovationAct" wallows in Congress, there is a common law tool to
protect innovation from the patent thicket lying right under our noses:
the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Properly applied, this judge-made
doctrine can be used to excuse infringement on a case-by-case basis if
the court determines that the accused product is substantially superior
to the patented invention, despite proof of literal infringement.
Unfortunately, the reverse doctrine is disfavored by the Court of
Appeals for the FederalCircuit and therefore rarely applied. It was not
always so. This Article is the first comprehensive study of published
opinions applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents to excuse
infringement between 1898, when the Supreme Court established the
doctrine, and the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit. This 7ost
precedent" reveals a flexible doctrine that takes into account the
technological and commercial superiority of the accused product to any
embodiment of the patented invention made by the patent-holder. An
invigorated reverse doctrine of equivalents could therefore serve to
protect true innovations from uncommercialized patents on a
case-by-case basis, without the potential harm to the innovation
incentive that prospective patent legislation might cause.

Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University Fowler School of Law. I thank
April Mara Cristal and Griffin Schindler, who provided invaluable research assistance as I wrote
this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Need to Promote Progressand Not Mere Invention
The Constitution empowers Congress to grant intellectual
property rights "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."1
But how do we define the "Progress" that society is entitled to receive
in exchange for the patent monopoly? Does "Progress" refer merely to
patented inventions, whether or not they are ever made or used? Or
does "Progress" refer to innovation-fully developed products or
processes made available for the benefit of the public. 2 Proponents of
patent reform argue that due to vexatious patent litigation, patents
work perversely to impede true innovation in the name of protecting a
vast thicket of patented inventions, the majority of which are never
commercialized. 3 This concern is echoed in modern patent theory, the
various schools of which are concerned with the value society receives
in exchange for granting patent monopolies beyond the eventual use of
the claimed inventions-what this author has called "unclaimed
consideration. '4 Commercialization theory, in particular, stands for
the proposition that the patent system should encourage the full

1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2.
This Article defines the difference between "innovation" and "invention" as
articulated by Professor Robert Merges:
An invention refers to the practical implementation of an inventor's idea. This often
takes the form of a prototype or model. An invention, then, is more than a concept (it
is usually a tangible thing), but less than the fully worked out product or process first
offered for sale to customers. An innovation is the 'debugged' and functional version of
the invention; the version first offered for sale.
Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 807 (1988) (emphases in original).
3.
See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); Walter Frick, Patents are Eating the World and
Hurting Innovation, HARV. Bus. REV. (June 26, 2014), http://hbr.org/2014/06/patents-are-eatingthe-world-and-hurting-innovation/ [https://perma.ccULU8-7XVN]; Press Release, Software &
Info. Indus. Ass'n, SIIA Applauds Innovation Act: Calls it an Important, Bipartisan Patent
Reform Effort (July 29, 2015), http://www.siia.net/Press/SIIA-Applauds-Innovation-Act-Calls-itan-Important-Bipartisan-Patent-Reform-Effort [https://perma.cc/2V2E-HZAK. The claims of less
than half of all patents are ever commercialized and only about 5 percent of patents are ever
licensed for a royalty. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362
(2010).
4.
See Samuel F. Ernst, Protecting the Boundaries: Unclaimed Consideration in the
Patentee's Social Contract, 18 TUL. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
1, 1 (2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2577925 [https://perma.cc/XD2S-95XG]. The
schools of patent theory discussed in this Article are commercialization theory, disclosure theory,
patent race theory, and patent signaling theory. See discussion infra Part III.
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commercialization and marketing of new products and not just new
5
inventions.
This concern is not new, however; it is as old as the
Constitution itself. Thomas Jefferson was dubious of the proposition
that patent monopolies benefited society sufficiently to justify the
harm they caused. Jefferson wrote to James Madison:
The
[It is better.. . to abolish... Monopolies, in all cases, than not to do it in any ....
saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is
spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of 14 years; but the benefit
monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general
even of limited
6
suppression.

Madison also shared
monopolies, writing:

this concern about the danger of patent

In all cases of monopoly, not excepting those in favor of Authors & inventors, it would be
well to reserve to the State, a right to extinguish the monopoly by paying a specified and
reasonable sum. This would guard against the public discontents resulting from the
exorbitant
gains of individuals, and from the inconvenient restrictions combined with
7
them.

Accordingly, the Constitutional Convention imposed a limitation on
Congress's intellectual property power: it must be exercised to
8
promote "Progress," and not mere invention.
The contemporary concern is that true innovators, who incur
the risk and expend the investment not only necessary to describe a
new invention but also to perfect it, promote it, and bring it to market,
are taxed by the vexatious assertion of "paper patents"-patents that
have not even been commercialized. Non-practicing patent assertion
entities imposed litigation costs on defendants of $29 billion in 2011
alone with their paper patents. 9 This figure neither includes the
indirect costs of litigation, such as the expense of engineer assistance
investigating
giving
depositions,
discovery,
collecting
in
defenses, and other tasks
and invalidity
noninfringement
See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 711
5.
(2012) ("Commercialization theory... hypothesizes that we grant patents in order to encourage
not invention but product development ... ").
1788),
(July 31,
to James Madison
Thomas Jefferson
6.
Letter from
http://founders.archives.gov/documentsfMadison/01-11-02-0147 [https://perma.ccVR8M-7H9K].
Detached Memoranda from James Madison on Banks (Jan. 31, 1820),
7.
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=%22grants%2of/*2Othis%20sort%20can%20be%20justified%20i
=
[https://perma.cc/
n%20very%20peculiar%20cases%20only%22&s=1111311111&sa=&r=l&sr
T5N3-8HST].
Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
8.
Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEo. L.J. 1771, 1810-16
(2006) (arguing that the Framers intended the "promote the Progress" clause to serve as a
limitation on Congress's intellectual property power).
James Bessen & Michael J. Maurer, Essay, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
9.
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 (2014).
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necessitating specialized knowledge, nor the jobs that could be
preserved or created with the money spent on defending litigation.
Additionally, this figure does not consider the substantial amount of
royalties paid to patent holders in licensing negotiations to avoid the
prospect of costly litigation. 10
B. The Common Law Solution: The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
Legislative patent reforms to address these problems have
endured a long purgatory in Congress." But judges traditionally had
an ideal tool to address this problem: the reverse doctrine of
equivalents. In a typical case, an accused product that meets each of
the claim limitations of the patent-in-suit does not avoid infringement
on the basis that additional features or improvements are added to the
claimed invention. 2 But in the 1898 case Boyden Power-Brake Co. v.
Westinghouse, the Supreme Court held that even if an accused product
falls literally within the words of an asserted patent claim, the judge
may determine that the accused product is so far changed in principle
from the patented invention that it should escape infringement. 13 In
making this determination, the Court looked beyond the words of the
claims to compare the principal of the patented invention to the
accused product. 14 Not only did the Court consider that the accused
improvement was technologically superior to the patented invention,
it also recognized the accused improvement's comparative commercial
success:
We are induced to look with more favor upon this device, not only because it is a novel
one, and a manifest departure from the principle of the Westinghouse patent, but
because it solved at once, in the simplest manner, the problem of quick action, whereas
prove to be a success until certain additional members
the Westinghouse patent did not
15
had been incorporated into it.

10.
See id. at 409; see also Samuel F. Ernst, Introduction to the Chapman Law Review
Symposium: Trolls or Toll-Takers: Do Intellectual Property Non-PracticingEntities Add Value to
Society?, 18 CHAPMAN L. REV. 611, 611 (2015).
For example, the "Innovation Act," H.R. 9, which is aimed at curbing abusive patent
11.
litigation, was removed from House floor consideration again last summer. See Dennis Crouch,
Patent Reform Slows Down in Congress, PATENTLY-O (July 15, 2015), http://patentlyo.comI
patent/2015/07/patent-reform-congress.html [https://perma.cc/WK49-DFVZ].
Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is fundamental
12.
that one cannot avoid infringement merely by adding elements if each element recited in the
claims is found in the accused device. For example, a pencil structurally infringing a patent
claim would not become noninfringing when incorporated into a complex machine that limits or
controls what the pencil can write.").
13.
Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898).
Id. at 569-71.
14.
15.
Id. at 572.
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The defendant's automatic train brake avoided infringement of the
plaintiffs patent even though it fell within the literal scope of the
commercially
and
technologically
was
it
because
claims
superior- technologically superior insofar as it solved the problem in
the art in a way that the patented invention failed to do and
commercially superior insofar as it was 16commercially more successful
than the patentee's commercial product.
This defense to patent infringement became known as the
"reverse doctrine of equivalents" in the wake of a 1950 Supreme Court
case, Graver Tank & Manufacturing Company v. Linde Air Products
Company, in which the Court again recognized the doctrine, this time
in dictum:
The wholesale realism of this doctrine [of equivalents] is not always applied in favor of a
patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus, where a device is so far changed in
principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a
substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim,
may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's
the doctrine of equivalents
17
action for infringement.

C. The Federal Circuit and the Death of the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents
The doctrine has been favored by scholars 18 but frowned upon
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the circuit court
created in 1982 to wield nationwide appellate jurisdiction over patent
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural
disputes.
Resources, Inc., the court referred to the reverse doctrine of
equivalents as an "anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely
applied." 19 The court asserted in dictum that the doctrine was no
longer necessary to cabin claims to their equitable scope, because
"when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, after the decision in Graver
Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description,
enablement, definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are

Id. at 569-71.
16.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09. The term may have originated with Charles F.
17.
Pigott, Jr., who called the doctrine "equivalents in reverse." Charles F. Pigott, Jr., Equivalents in
Reverse, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 291 (1966).
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
18.
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1024-29 (1997) (arguing that copyright law unfortunately lacks a
doctrine akin to patent law's reverse doctrine of equivalents to protect radical improvers); Robert
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and BargainingBreakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents,
62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 94-95 (1994) (arguing that the reverse doctrine of equivalents is justified as
a solution to situations where bargaining breakdown between patent holders and innovators of
substantial improvements to patented inventions results in social welfare cost).
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368
19.
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
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co-extensive with the broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents." 20 In Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., the court
similarly noted that "[t]he reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely
applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of
noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents. ' 21 After
its inception in 1982, the court began the practice of reversing or
vacating district court decisions finding noninfringement under the
22
reverse doctrine of equivalents.
D. The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
The Federal Circuit's characterization of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is incorrect on multiple points. In the years between
1898, when the Supreme Court applied the doctrine in Boyden v.
Westinghouse, and the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit, the
reverse doctrine of equivalents was applied with some regularity
(although not frequently) by the federal courts to excuse literal
infringement.
These cases, particularly the pre-Graver Tank
precedent, go uncited and forgotten, perhaps because they omit the
later-coined name for the doctrine upon which they rely: the "reverse
'23
doctrine of equivalents.
This is the first Article to study in a comprehensive way the
pre-Graver Tank published cases that rely on the doctrine of Boyden v.
Westinghouse to excuse infringement. 24 The doctrine is revealed as a
20.
Id.
21.
Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
22.
Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 662 F.Supp. 622, 628 (E.D. Tex.
1987), rev'd, 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reversing noninfringement under the reverse
doctrine of equivalents because "hemoglobin does not operate in a substantially different way
from the compounds claimed-which include hemoglobin-and we reject Helena's argument
based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents"); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 591 F.
Supp. 464, 471 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd 775 F.2d 1107, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(vacating summary judgment of noninfringement under the reverse DOE and remanding for trial
"[b]ecause in this case there is a genuine issue of material fact respecting whether ME's filter
and camera structure is so far changed in principle that it performs the same or a similar
function in a substantially different way...").
23.
See cases cited infra notes 43-50 for examples of cases that rely on the reverse
doctrine of equivalents but do not call it by that name. As noted above, the term may have been
coined by Robert J. Pigott, Jr. in 1966. See Pigott, supra note 17, at 296. One of the earliest cases
to employ the term "reverse equivalents" is a 1969 case, Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 301 F. Supp.
273 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), although it is not clear that this case is, in fact, referring to the reverse
doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 289 ("Consequently, what may be called the doctrine of 'reverse
equivalents,' under which the broader claim includes the lesser subject matter, would apply in
this case to place the uses of the composition on these latter plants within the patent's
protection."). Another early case to use the term is Application of Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607
(C.C.P.A. 1977) ("[T]he judicially-developed 'reverse doctrine of equivalents,' ... may be safely
relied upon to preclude improper enforcement against later developers.").
24.
See infra Part II.
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flexible doctrine that takes into account not only the equitable scope of
the asserted patent claims, but also an assessment of the accused
device, including whether it enjoys commercial success lacking in any
embodiment of the patented invention. 2 5 As such, the reverse doctrine
of equivalents takes into account the value of innovation effort and
success to society in a way that is highly compatible with not only
commercialization theory, but also other patent theories that value
consideration received by society in return for the patent grant that
goes beyond the scope of patent claims.
Part II further discusses how these pre-Federal Circuit cases
do not treat the doctrine as a rare or disfavored doctrine, 26 or-as
scholars have phrased it-a doctrine reserved only for "radical
improvements. ' 27 To the contrary, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits required the district court to always consider reverse
equivalents prior to determining infringement as part of the
affirmative infringement case. 28 Moreover, the standard was whether
the accused product was "substantially changed" from the patented
invention; there was no requirement that it constitute a "radical
improvement. ' 29 Indeed, the concept of a "radical improvement"
30
appears to have originated in scholarly articles, not in the case law.
Part II goes on to discuss that this early precedent does not
apply the doctrine in a manner duplicative of the enablement and
written description requirements of the 1952 Patent Act, as the
Federal Circuit asserted in the Tate Access Floors case. 31 There are a
handful of cases that invoke the doctrine as a type of narrow claim
construction, limiting the claims to the preferred embodiments. But
most of these cases involve a comparison of the patent disclosure (or
even the patent-holder's commercial embodiment) to the accused
improvement on the patented invention to determine if the improver
has substantially improved upon the patented invention. Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit's statement in Tate Access Floors that the doctrine

In referring to the "embodiment" of an invention, I am referring to any product or
25.
reduction to practice that the patent holder has made of the invention claimed in the patent.
See, e.g., Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368 (stating that the reverse doctrine of
26.
equivalents is an "anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely applied").
See, e.g., Merges, supra note 18, at 93-94 ("[Blecause the doctrine is still good law, a
27.
pioneer always has some risk that a court will excuse a radical improvement from infringement
despite the fact that it is clearly covered by the patentee's claims.")
See infra Section II.C.
28.
See infra Section II.D.
29.
Id.
30.
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368.
31.
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has been rendered superfluous by the 1952 codification of the written
32
description and enablement defenses is incorrect.
The Article proceeds, in Part III, to tie the reverse doctrine of
equivalents as properly understood to modern theories of patent
scholarship-commercialization theory, patent race theory, disclosure
theory, and signaling theory-which, by and large,' conclude that a
primary or substantial consideration society receives in exchange for
the patent monopoly are improvements, information, and
A
commercialization beyond the scope of patented inventions.
revitalized reverse doctrine of equivalents would be a useful reform to
the patent system because it provides a defense to accused infringers
who can prove that they have provided society with substantial
"unclaimed consideration"
in
the
form of commercialized
improvements of the patented invention.
The Article concludes in Part IV by examining ways in which
the reverse doctrine of equivalents might be reformed and refined to
serve as a more attractive and effective judicial tool. The doctrine
should not be rare or reserved for "radical improvements." Because
the doctrine is simply the doctrine of equivalents in reverse, it should
also measure "substantial difference." 33 Moreover, the doctrine should
34
excuse equivalent infringement, and not just literal infringement.
One problem with the reverse doctrine of equivalents as
currently articulated is that it offers amorphous and undefined
standards that may be unattractive to judges inclined to formalism; 35
the court must determine whether the accused infringer has created a
product that is "so far changed in principle from a patented article" as
to be "substantially different." 36 The doctrine would benefit by a clear
and detailed legal standard related to its policies, leading to
predictable results and ease of judicial application. This Article
recommends that in addition to examining the accused product's
technological change from the patented invention, courts should also

32.
See infra Section lI.E. The enablement and written description defenses are codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2014) as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2014).

33.
See infra Section W.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
34.
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
35.
1575, 1673 (2003) (citing John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
771, 772-73 (2003)).
36.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
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compare the commercial success of the accused product to any product
manufactured by the patent-holder. Such a factor would empower the
reverse doctrine of equivalents as a policy tool to encourage
37
innovation, not just invention.
To forestall concerns that the doctrine would unfairly reward
financially advantaged companies that have the capital to create a
successful product through marketing and other non-technical
innovations, courts can impose a nexus requirement. Specifically, the
accused infringer would be required to show that there is a nexus
between the required commercial success of the accused product and
the substantial technological improvement it offers. This comparison
of the technological and commercial success of the accused product to
that of any embodiment of the patented invention would be
particularly effective in curbing vexatious litigation brought by
non-practicing entities that do not, after all, produce a commercial
38
product.
The doctrine would also allow courts to implement reform on a
case-by-case basis, weighing the equities of the particular parties
before them. Accordingly, this judicial reform would address the
concerns of opponents of legislative patent reform who argue that
comprehensive, prospective legislation could harm innovation in
unpredictable ways. For these reasons, this Article argues that the
reverse doctrine of equivalents may be the patent reform that is lying
right under our noses. And it can be grounded in precedent: the lost
39
precedent of the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
II. THE LOST PRECEDENT OF THE REVERSE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

One common misunderstanding with respect to the reverse
doctrine of equivalents is that it has been uniformly disfavored and
rarely, if ever, invoked since the Supreme Court applied it in Boyden
v. Westinghouse. The Federal Circuit has called it an "anachronistic
exception, long mentioned but rarely applied. ' '40 But this author's
review of the published case law reveals that courts have found or
affirmed noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents at

See infra Section IV.C.
37.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368. See also Michael A. Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 118 (2004) ("Courts have
applied the RDOE to excuse infringement very rarely, and not in the past century."); Stephen M.
Maurer, Ideas Into Practice: How Well Does U.S. Patent Law Implement Modern Innovation
Theory?, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 644, 687 (2013) ("Strangely, most of what we
know about the Doctrine still comes from the original Westinghouse opinion.").
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fairly regular (if infrequent) intervals in the decades following Boyden,
leading all the way up to and past the 1982 founding of the Federal
Circuit. Further, these cases do not suggest that the doctrine should
41
be disfavored or rarely applied.
A. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Was Regularly Applied
Between 1898 and 1988
The Supreme Court found noninfringement under the reverse
doctrine of equivalents in Boyden in 1898.42 Published opinions
indicating a court's application of the doctrine to find or affirm
noninfringement appear at least four times in the 1900s, 43 twice in the
1910s,

44

1940s,

47

twice in the 1920s, 45 eight times in the 1930s,46 twice in the
once in the 1960s, 48 four times in the 1970s, 49 and seven times

in the 1980s-with the Federal Circuit then emerging to reverse the

See also George M. Sirilla, Thomas P. Feddo, & Michael C. Antone, The Doctrine of
41.
Equivalents: Both a Sword and a Shield, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 75, 83-84 (2003) ("During the time
between the Graver Tank decision in 1950 and the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982,
numerous decisions of circuit courts of appeals, the Court of Claims, and district courts have
applied the DOE as a shield to find no infringement of patent claims otherwise readable on the
accused device or activity."). Moreover, as this Article demonstrates, numerous decisions prior to
Graver Tank-beginning with the Supreme Court's 1898 decision in Boyden-found or affirmed
noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents; these are cases that are often
forgotten because the doctrine had not yet been so named.
Boyden Power-Brake, 170 U.S. at 573.
42.
43.
See Duncan v. Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co., 171 F. 656, 665-66 (6th Cir. 1909);
Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 126 F. 639, 649 (6th Cir. 1903); General
Elec. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 171 F. 666, 669 (D.N.J. 1909); Severy Process Co. v. Harper &
Bros., 113 F. 581, 584-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1902).
Borland v. Northern Trust Safe Deposit Co., 212 F. 178, 184 (N.D. Ill. 1914);
44.
American Stoker Co. v. Underfeed Stoker Co. of Am., 182 F. 642, 653 (W.D. Pa. 1910).
45.
Morgan Constr. Co. v. Donner Steel Co., 277 F. 221, 224 (2d Cir. 1921); Cadwell v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 13 F.2d 483, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1926).
46.
Craftmint Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 94 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1938); British Acoustic
Films, Ltd. v. Electrical Research Prods., 29 F. Supp. 531, 535-36 (D. Del. 1939); General Elec.
Co. v. Amperex Elec. Prods., 15 F. Supp. 438, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); Radio Corp. of Am. v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 16 F. Supp. 610, 613-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); T.H. Symington & Son, Inc. v.
Symington Co., 9 F. Supp. 699, 708 (D. Md. 1935); Cinema Patents Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 55 F.2d 948, 956 (E.D.N.Y. 1932); Esnault-Pelterie v. Chance Bought Corp., 56 F.2d 393,
405 (E.D.N.Y. 1932); Baker Perkins Co. v. Thomas Roulston, Inc., 52 F.2d 799, 801 (E.D.N.Y.
1931).
47.
Wheeling Stamping Co. v. Standard Cap & Molding Co., 60 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D.
Md. 1945); Meikle v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 44 F. Supp. 460, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
Nickerson v. The Bearfoot Sole Co., 311 F.2d 858, 881 (6th Cir. 1963).
48.
49.
Leesona Corp. v. U.S., 530 F.2d 896, 906 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Harris v. NRM Corp., 1976
WL 21012 at *6 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55,
70 (S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 506 F.2d 960, 965 (5th Cir. 1972); Marvin Glass Co. & Assocs. v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 (S.D. Tex. 1970), affld, 448 F.2d 60, 61-62 (5th Cir.
1971).
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district courts' conclusions in at least two instances. 50 These figures
include six opinions by circuit courts of appeals and one opinion by the
51
Court of Claims that constitutes binding Federal Circuit precedent.
These numbers are conservative insofar as they only include cases
that make a final finding of noninfringement under the doctrine or
affirm such a finding. Not included in this count are additional cases
favorable to the reverse doctrine of equivalents that deny or vacate
summary judgment of infringement based on a dispute of fact with
respect to whether the reverse doctrine of equivalents would result in
52
noninfringement, including one such case from the Federal Circuit.

Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 662 F. Supp. 622, 628 (E.D. Tex.
50.
1987), rev'd, 859 F.2d 878, 890 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Thus, hemoglobin does not operate in a
substantially different way from the compounds claimed-which include hemoglobin-and we
reject Helena's argument based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents."); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp. of Am., 591 F. Supp. 464, 471 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 775 F.2d 1107, 1122-23 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (vacating summary judgment of noninfringement under the reverse DOE
and remanding for trial "[blecause in this case there is a genuine issue of material fact respecting
whether MEI's filter and camera structure is so far changed in principle that it performs the
same or a similar function in a substantially different way..."); see, e.g., Mead Dig. Sys., Inc. v.
A.B. Dick Co., 723 F.2d 455, 462-64 (6th Cir. 1983); Precision Metal Fabricators, Inc., v.
Jetstream Sys. Co., 693 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Technicon Instruments Corp. v.
Alpkem Corp., 664 F. Supp. 1558, 1575 (D. Or. 1986), affd, 837 F.2d 1097, *1 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Brenner v. Recognition Equip. Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Foster Wheeler
Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 512 F. Supp. 792, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Mead Digital Sys., Inc., 723 F.2d at 462-64; Nickerson, 311 F.2d at 881; Craftmint
51.
Mfg. Co., 94 F.2d at 373; Morgan Constr. Co. v. Donner Steel Co., 277 F. 221, 224 (2d Cir. 1921);
Duncan v. Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co., 171 F. 656, 665-66 (6th Cir. 1909); Standard
Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 126 F. 639, 649 (6th Cir. 1903); Leesona Corp., 530
F.2d at 906. Nor is the Federal Circuit wholly accurate in its repeated statement that "[niot once
has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of
equivalents." Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368; see also Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc.,
531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Mhis court has never affirmed a finding of
noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents."). In Technicon, the District Court for
the District of Oregon considered whether a patent on a system for continuous flow analysis of
blood and other body fluids was infringed by the defendant's improved instrument that added air
bubbles to the sample stream. Technicon, 664 F. Supp. at 1562-63, 1565-66. The court held that
the accused system was "very different in principle from the '593 patent" and that "[u]nder the
reverse doctrine of equivalents, [one would] find the RFA-300 does not infringe the '593 patent."
Id. at 1575. The Federal Circuit affirmed noninfringement in a non-published opinion that omits
mention of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp.,
837 F.2d 1097, *1 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc. 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed.
52.
Cir. 1991) ("Genentech argues that its product is equitably seen as changed 'in principle'.., an
assertion disputed by Scripps, but which if found to be correct could provide-depending on the
specific facts of similarities and differences-sufficient ground for invoking the reverse
doctrine."); see also Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis v. Idexx Labs., 973 F.Supp. 24, 28 (D. Maine 1997)
("Having carried its burden of establishing a prima facie case on the reverse doctrine of
equivalents, IDEXX has rendered summary judgment inappropriate on the whole blood
product."); Union Carbide Corp. v. Tarancon Corp., 682 F. Supp. 535, 542 (N.D. Ga. 1988)
("Furthermore, even if the court could find that the claim language reads clearly on defendants'
accused apparatus, there would remain a question of fact whether defendants' apparatus
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B. The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
Consideredthe Practicaland CommercialSuccess of the Accused
Product
This lost precedent of the reverse doctrine of equivalents
applies the doctrine in a flexible manner that takes into account the
relative technological and commercial successes of the accused product
and any embodiment produced by the patent-holder. For example, the
asserted patent in Severy Process v. Harper& Brothers53 claimed a bed
for the platen of a printing press (the plate that presses the paper
against the type) composed of "elastic bristles or wires."5 4 The accused
defendant achieved substantial practical and commercial success by
manufacturing a platen out of "wire coils, interlocked, and held in
place between two thin sheets of rubber," whereas the patent-holder's
platens were a "lamentable failure." 55 Rather than delving deeply into
semiotic puzzling over whether "elastic bristles and wires" can be
fairly construed to encompass wire coils, as a contemporary court
would, the court stepped back to take a practical look at the situation
of the litigants giving rise to the litigation:
Considered from a practical and commercial point of view two propositions are
incontestably established by the proof. First. That the complainant's blanket is a
lamentable failure. Second. That the defendant's blanket is a pre-eminent success. The
Severy patent has been in existence for over six years and as late as October, 1900, the
complainants had not succeeded in producing a successful commercial blanket. At that
time they had, apparently, abandoned the device as shown in the specification and
drawings and were experimenting with a blanket consisting of a thin sheet of brass ....
The defendant's blanket, though it was not put on the market until the autumn of 1898,
was successful from the start. Large numbers of the devices are in actual use in various
printing establishments and are paying royalty to the manufacturer ....56

Hence, the court did not restrict its analysis to a determination of the
technical differences between the patented invention and the accused
product. Rather, the court found noninfringement under the reverse
doctrine of equivalents based, in part, on a finding that the accused
product was a greater commercial success than the patent holder's
product, which was a commercial failure.
The Severy court found noninfringement under Boyden v.
Westinghouse, quoting that case for the proposition that
[t]he patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the latter
has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally

performs the fluorination function in a substantially different way than does plaintiffs
apparatus.").
53.
113 F. 581, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1902).
Id.
54.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 583.
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construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to be
has to be convicted
adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute
57
when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent.

The court concluded with the observation that "it will not only be an
injustice to the defendant and its licensors, but to the public as well, to
compel them, and future improvers also, to pay tribute to the Severy
58
patent.
Hence, the Severy case exemplifies what the Supreme Court
characterized in Graver Tank as "[tlhe wholesale realism of this
doctrine [of equivalents]," which is "not always applied in favor of the
patentee but is sometimes used against him. '59 The Severy case is
refreshing in its avoidance of the technical parsing of claim terms
common to contemporary infringement analysis. 60 Instead, the court
confronted a situation where the accused infringer has given to society
an improvement far beyond the patent holder's failed attempts-the
accused party had actually solved the problem in the art-regardless
of whether the improvement technically fell within the language of the
claims. In such a situation, it benefits society to excuse infringement
so that the grant of the patent monopoly does not act perversely to
impede the greater innovation.
This weighing of practical and commercial success occurs
repeatedly in this "lost" reverse doctrine of equivalents precedent. In
the 1909 case of General Electric Co. v. Allis Chalmers Co., the District
Court for the District of New Jersey found noninfringement under the
reverse doctrine of equivalents even though "the defendant's device
may be within the language of the claim," because "[i]nfringement is
not a mere matter of words. ' 61 Among the stilts upon which the court
rested its holding was the following assessment of commercial success:
The complainant's patent has never been used to any considerable extent. Only about
50 of them were ever made, and their use was abandoned 8 or 9 years ago. On the
movement,
contrary, the defendant's device has provided a successful notch-to-notch
62
and, when used normally and naturally, cannot act otherwise.

Once again, the court relied on an assessment of the
commercial success of the accused product as compared to the
commercial failure of the patent holder's product.

Id. at 584 (quoting Boyden Power-Brake, 170 U.S. at 568).
57.
58.
Id. at 586.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
59.
See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
60.
(holding that claim construction should be analyzed primarily in light of the claim language, the
specification, and the prosecution history).
171 F. 666, 669 (D.N.J. 1909).
61.
62.
Id. at 670.
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Similarly, in Wheeling Stamping Co. v. Standard Cap &
Molding Co., the District Court for the District of Maryland
considered the relative innovations that the patent holder and the
accused infringer had given to society.
The court found
noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, observing
that "the history of the three patents indicates that, assuming they
are operable, nevertheless, they are of extremely doubtful commercial
utility. '63 The court observed that the patents-in-suit "have proved to
be little more than paper patents,"64 meaning that the claimed
inventions have never been reduced to actual practice. "[O]n the other
hand, the defendant's device, while not patented... is now in
extensive commercial use." 65 In effect, the court declined to reward a
plaintiff who had given nothing to society beyond a piece of paper at
the expense of a defendant who has brought to the market a successful
commercial product.
This emphasis on the value to society of the accused innovation
over the asserted invention rings a chord with commercialization
theory, which emphasizes the social utility of the investment and
activity required to produce an innovation: the development of a
working prototype, market testing and marketing, distribution of the
commercial product, product improvements, and other activities
"which are fraught with uncertainty and great expense." 66 More
generally, the reverse doctrine of equivalents serves to protect the
consideration society receives in exchange for the patent grant beyond
67
the value of patented inventions-here, a successful improvement.
C. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Was Not a Disfavored Doctrine
Priorto the 1982 Creationof the Federal Circuit
The two Supreme Court opinions discussing the reverse
doctrine of equivalents contain no language suggesting that it is a
disfavored doctrine or rare phenomenon, as the Federal Circuit
opinions discussed earlier maintain. In Boyden, the Court stated:
We have repeatedly held that a charge of infringement is sometimes made out, though
the letter of the claims be avoided. The converse is equally true. The patentee may
bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the latter has so far changed

63.
60 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D. Md. 1945).
64.
Id.
65.
Id. See also Cadwell, 13 F.2d at 489 ("Defendant has produced and marketed in
quantities the tire of which complaint is made, while so far as I can find from the record, no tires
constructed in accordance with the patent in suit have ever been manufactured ... .
66.
Sichelman, supra note 3, at 348-54.
67.
This need concerns many other modern patent law theories as well, as discussed
below. See infra Section III.
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the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally construed, have ceased
to represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to be adjudged an infringer as
has to be convicted, when he has done
one who has violated the letter of a statute
68
nothing in conflict with it spirit and intent.

Fifty-two years later, in Graver Tank, the Court spoke in the same
tone, giving no indication that the reverse doctrine of equivalents was
disfavored or rarely applied: "The wholesale realism of this doctrine is
not always applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used
'69
against him.
The court of appeals and district court cases outside of the
Federal Circuit similarly treated the reverse doctrine of equivalents as
nothing extraordinary. Indeed, there is a body of precedent standing
for the proposition that reverse equivalents must always be considered
prior to finding infringement. In Mead Digital Systems v. A.B. Dick
Co., the Sixth Circuit affirmed noninfringement under the reverse
doctrine of equivalents and made clear that the question must always
be considered:
Infringement should not be determined by a mere decision that the terms of a claim of a
valid patent are applicable to the defendant's device. Two things are not necessarily
similar in a practical sense because the same words are applicable to each.... Put
differently, the doctrine of literal infringement is informed by the doctrine of
equivalents: in infringement actions the court must consider the substance of the
invention along with the form of the claims. Thus, even were we to determine that the
DIJIT printer "reads on" claims 1 and 33 of the Sweet patent, we would still be required
70
to consider whether those claims should be restricted by the doctrine of equivalents.

In Mead Digital Systems, the Sixth Circuit did not even consider the
plaintiffs arguments that the accused device read literally on the
asserted claims, stating, "Since we determine that the DIJIT printer is
not the equivalent of the invention disclosed in the Sweet patent, we
need not consider whether it is in literal infringement. '71 Other
courts, including the Second and Ninth Circuits, also have precedent
to the effect that the reverse doctrine of equivalents must always be
considered prior to finding infringement. 72 As the Second Circuit
68.
Boyden Power-Brake, 170 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added).
69.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (emphasis added).
70.
Mead Dig. Sys., Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co., 723 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphases
added).
71.
Id. at n.12.
72.
See, e.g., Craftmint Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 94 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1938) ('The fact
that the claims of appellees' patent are broad enough to cover the appellant's process and
medium paper does not establish infringement. To infringe there must be identity of process or
combinations of materials used with those described in the patent or their equivalent.") (citing
Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. at 568); Morgan Constr. Co. v. Donner Steel Co., 277 F. 221,
224 (2d Cir. 1921) ("Of the claims quoted, the first will undoubtedly, if read literally, cover
defendant's device; but that is not final. It remains to inquire whether the alleged infringement
displays 'substantial identity' with the thing invented."); see also British Acoustic Films, Ltd. v.
Electrical Research Prods., 29 F. Supp. 531, 535-36 (D. Del. 1939) ("Even if Poulsen's claims 1
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poetically put it in 1917, "There is no magic in a name, nor in a claim;
that the words preferred by a patentee to define his invention apply
literally to another's device suggests, but does not prove, infringement;

there must be a substantial identity, to justify that conclusion of
law."

73

In the same vein, patent scholar Charles Pigott, Jr. described a
principal in 1966 that is wholly alien to the Federal Circuit era
understanding of patent law:
It is well settled that merely because the claims in suit taken literally read element by
element on the accused device does not establish infringement, nor does it establish a
presumption of infringement. The patentee in order to prove infringement has the
burden of showing that the accused structure is the equivalent of the particular
embodiment of the claimed structure disclosed in the specification and drawings. That
is, the patentee, while he may be allowed some range of equivalents, must compare the
accused structure with the patented structure as disclosed in the specification and
74
drawings, and he must establish substantial identity of means, operation, and result.

The Federal Circuit has adopted a rule that is quite to the contrary,
holding that the reverse doctrine of equivalents must be explicitly
raised

as

an affirmative

defense,

rather

than

negated

by the

patent-holder to prove infringement in the first instance: "One does
not make a reverse doctrine of equivalents argument simply by
of equivalents
a defense to literal or doctrine
mounting
infringement. '75
Instead, "[w]hen a patentee establishes literal

infringement, the accused infringer may undertake the burden of
going forward to establish the fact of noninfringement under the
'76
reverse doctrine of equivalents.
D. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Was Not Reserved for "Radical
Improvements"

One of the reasons the reverse doctrine of equivalents is
perceived as rare and anachronistic is because scholars have argued
that it is reserved for "radical improvements. ' 77 In the scholarly
community, there is a debate over whether application of the doctrine
and 2 could be read upon [the] PS-24 machine infringement would not follow. It must be
determined that the device of the defendant is not merely in words but in fact the invention of
the patent.") (citing Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. at 568).
Linde Air Products Co. v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 246 F. 834, 838 (2d Cir.
73.
1917).
74.
Pigott, supra note 17, at 292 (emphasis added).
75.
Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1176 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
76.
SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
77.
See, e.g., Merges, supra note 18, at 93-94 ("[Blecause the doctrine is still good law, a
pioneer always has some risk that a court will excuse a radical improvement from infringement
despite the fact that it is clearly covered by the patentee's claims.").
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requires the accused product to be a "radical improvement" or if a
merely "substantial" change in principal of the patented invention
The concept of a "radical
suffices to avoid infringement. 78
improvement" is foreign to the early case law on the reverse doctrine
of equivalents and is noticeably absent from Supreme Court
precedent. Instead, the Court has relied on a "substantial identity"
standard. 79 The doctrine applies "where a device is so far changed in
principal from a patented article that it performs the same or a
similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls
within the literal scope of the claim. ...,"80 Lower court opinions
apply the same "substantial identity" standard.8 1 Indeed, the notion
of limiting the defense to "radical improvers" appears to have
scholarly origins.8 2 The only federal case this author has found
mentioning such a limitation comes from the District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, which in turn found the phrase in scholarly
articles.83
In fact, the defense is simply the doctrine of equivalents used
defensively8 4 and should therefore apply the same standard as the
doctrine of equivalents-but in reverse. Accordingly, an accused
product avoids infringement by reverse equivalents when it is
substantially changed from the principal of the asserted patent,
despite literal infringement.8 5 Such a rule reaps more benefit to
society than a "radical improvement" requirement by allowing society
to both enjoy the use of substantial, and not just radical,

See Maurer, supra note 40, at 687-89 (summarizing the debate).
78.
Boyden Power-Brake, 170 U.S. at 568.
79.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09 (emphasis added).
80.
81.
See, e.g., Morgan Constr. Co. v. Donner Steel Co., 277 F. 221, 224 (2d Cir. 1921) ("Of
the claims quoted, the first will undoubtedly, if read literally, cover defendant's device; but that
is not final. It remains to inquire whether the alleged infringement displays 'substantial identity'
with the thing invented."); see also Nickerson, 311 F.2d at 881 ("[W]e have concluded that there
is no substantial identity of mode of operation between the Bearfoot side wall and the Nickerson
side wall .. ");Linde Air Products Co. v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 246 F. 834, 838 (2d Cir.
1917) ("[Tlhat the words preferred by a patentee to define his invention apply literally to
another's device suggests, but does not prove, infringement; there must be substantial identity,
to justify that conclusion of law.").
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265, 279, 292
82.
(2011) (noting that academics have relied on this justification since the 1980s).
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 202, 287-89 (D. Mass.
83.
2004) (citing Lemley, supra note 18, at 991, 1011, 1067) ("The application of the reverse doctrine
is to protect substantial improvers from infringing if they are sufficiently radical."); Merges,
supra note 18, at 92-94 (noting that the alleged infringer must show a "radical improvement" or
"significant contribution").
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 ('The wholesale realism of this doctrine is not always
84.
applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used against him.").
Id. at 608-09.
85.
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improvements on patented inventions and extracting such innovations
from the patent thicket.
Patent scholar Deepa Varadarajan also takes issue with the
notion that the doctrine is reserved for "radical improvers. '86
According to Professor Varadarajan, however, this is because "a
court's [reverse doctrine of equivalents] analysis is not an explicit
consideration of improvement" at all.8 7 "Rather, in practice, the
inquiry is a more formalistic assessment of difference. 8 8s But as
discussed above, the early cases indicate that the courts would
consider substantial technological and commercial improvement, not
just difference.8 9
E. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Was Not Redundant of the
Enablement and Written DescriptionRequirements
The Federal Circuit is also incorrect that the need for the
reverse doctrine of equivalents is obviated by the 1952 Patent Act's
implementation of Section 112.90 Generally speaking, the enablement
and written description requirements of Section 112 require that the
claims be supported by a specification that both enables a person of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention and
demonstrates that the inventor was in possession of the claimed
invention. 9 1 In Tate Access Floors v. Interface ArchitecturalResources,
Inc., the Federal Circuit wrote that these and other requirements
imposed by the 1952 passage of Section 112 rendered the judicially
created reverse doctrine of equivalents unnecessary. 92 This was
because many of the cases applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents
engaged in an analysis that would narrow the claims to match the
disclosures of the specification. 93 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
86.
See Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEo. MASON L. REV. 657, 690
(2014).
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
See supra Section II.B.
90.
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368 ("[WMhen Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112
after the decision in Graver Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description,
enablement, definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with the
broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents.").
91.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112. See generally Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (explaining the enablement and written description requirements
of Section 112).
92.
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368.
93.
See, e.g., Lockwood v. United Bakeries Inc., 324 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1963) ("Even if
a claim can be read in terms upon an accused article, infringement does not necessarily follow
unless it can be found as an ultimate fact that the article uses the inventor's idea as embodied in
the inventor's design and drawings and that there is sameness or equivalence of function and
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wrote in Tate Access that "when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112,
after the decision in Graver Tank, it imposed requirements for the
and
definiteness,
enablement,
description,
written
means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with the broadest
' 94
possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents."
The Federal Circuit's analysis is flawed for several reasons.
First, the enablement and claim definiteness requirements trace their
origins to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and were merely
Hence, these requirements
codified by the 1952 Patent Act. 95
traditionally coexisted with the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
Moreover, the reverse doctrine of equivalents is not substantively
redundant of the Section 112 requirements. Granted, there have been
cases over the years that apply the doctrine in a way that is akin to
narrow claim construction, limiting the claims to the specification
disclosures. 96 But the cases largely undertake the different task of
comparing the accused device to the patented invention (or even its
commercial embodiment) and asking whether the accused device is
Accordingly, the reverse doctrine of
substantially different.9 7

means."); see also Foster Cathead Co. v. Hasha, 382 F.2d 761, 765, 766 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967)
("Accordingly, no matter how broad the claims may be when taken literally, and even though
they may avoid the prior art when given the broadest interpretation, nevertheless the claims can
cover only the particular embodiment the patentee has disclosed and equivalents thereof.");
Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 512 F. Supp. 792, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ('The
present case is a much stronger one for the application of the 'reverse' doctrine because all of
[the] original claims were limited, and the patent specification was never amended.").
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368.
94.
95.
See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 260 (6th ed. 2013) ("An important early case, Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S.
218 (1832), employed the contract metaphor to lay the groundwork for the modern enablement
doctrine in the U.S."); id. at 316 ('This principle has deep roots. The Supreme Court, in Evans v.
Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 432-33 (1822), interpreted the disclosure section of the 1793
statute as having two purposes: (1) 'to make known the manner of constructing the [invention] so
as to enable artisans to make and use it,' and (2) 'to put the public in possession of what the
party claims as his own invention' so as to prevent the inventor from 'pretending that his
invention is more than what it really is, or different from its ostensible objects."').
96.
See, e.g., supra note 93.
See, e.g., Nickerson, 311 F.2d at 881 ("[T]here is no infringement by appellants, for
97.
the mode of operation of their side wall is different, and there is no equivalency of means.");
Duncan v. Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co., 171 F. 656, 665 (6th Cir. 1909) ('The case seems to
us an excellent illustration of the rule that when each of the two inventors improve upon the
former art, each in his distinct and separate way, they shall each be credited with his own
improvement."); Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 126 F. 639, 649 (6th Cir.
1903) ('If with other means a kind of flexibility between the weighing beam and the computing
beam is supplied, it is done by a different mechanism operating in a different way."); Technicon
Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 664 F. Supp. 1558, 1575 (D. Or. 1986) ("The RFA-300 is very
different in principle from the '598 patent. Under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, I find the
RFA-300 does not infringe the '593 patent."); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340
F. Supp. 55, 70 (S.D. Fla. 1972) ("While the patent claims may be literally construed to describe
the weakened centers of the bristles of Defendants' mats, the principle of Defendants' product is
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equivalents serves a different function from ensuring that claims are
described and enabled in the specification; it preserves to society
substantial improvements that are changed in principle from the
98
patented invention.
What this author has described as the "lost precedent" of the
reverse doctrine of equivalents is the large body of district court and
regional circuit court cases applying the doctrine favorably prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit. One may wonder if this body of case
law is truly lost, insofar as it is not binding on the Federal Circuit,
which now has exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over
patent law cases. However, it must be emphasized again that the
Supreme Court has never suggested that the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is disfavored or rare. And the Federal Circuit has only
made such statements in panel opinions. 99 The Supreme Court or the
en banc Federal Circuit could revive and strengthen the doctrine, a
different from and does not embody the spirit or intent of the claimed invention."); Wheeling
Stamping Co. v. Standard Cap & Molding Co., 60 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D. Md. 1945) (reasoning
that plaintiffs patents "have proved to be little more than paper patents; whereas, on the other
hand, the defendant's device, while not patented, not only has features as respects both
construction and operation that are distinctly different from any described in the claims or
specifications of plaintiffs' patents, but is now in extensive commercial use"); Meikle v.
Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 44 F. Supp. 460, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1942) ("While claims 13 and 14 of the
reissue patent read in terms on some of the accused structures, the accused structures differ in
mode of operation and result from the patent disclosures."); Radio Corp. of Am. v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co., 16 F. Supp. 610, 613-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) ("[lt appears that the defendant's devices,
which are alleged to infringe, use a radically different arrangement to accomplish an old result,
and irrespective of the validity of the patent in suit or whether or not the claims are readable on
defendant's antennas."); T.H. Symington & Son, Inc. v. Symington Co., 9 F. Supp. 699, 708 (D.
Md. 1935) ("It is apparent on inspection that the defendant's coil-eliptic arrangement is different
in form and appearance from the plaintiffs device, but more importantly, the principle and
result ... is different ... "); Cadwell, 13 F.2d at 489 ("Defendant has produced and marketed in
quantities the tire of which complaint is made, while so far as I can find from the record, no tires
");
constructed in accordance with the patent in suit have ever been manufactured ..
Allis-Chalmers Co., 171 F. at 670 ("The defendant has applied a different principle, and uses
different means to accomplish the desired result."); Severy Process Co., 113 F. at 586 ("Each of
the devices in controversy has advantages peculiarly its own. There is room enough in the art for
both.").
98.
See Nathaniel Durrance, How the Doctrine of Equivalents May Save Claim
Construction, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 73, 81 (2005) ("As contemplated by the RDOE, however, there may
be situations when the requirements of [35 U.S.C.] § 112 are met, such as enablement and
written description, but where it may be inequitable to give the patentee the full breadth of the
literal claim scope due to a subsequent advancement in technology."). As discussed in Sirilla et
al. supra note 41, at 81-82, the Supreme Court has rejected a similar argument that Section 112
of the 1952 Act tacitly eliminated the doctrine of equivalents altogether (and not merely the
reverse doctrine of equivalents). See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 28 (1997) ("[The lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents strongly supports adherence to
our refusal in Graver Tank to find that the Patent Act conflicts with that doctrine. Congress can
legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy
arguments now made by both sides are thus best addressed to Congress, not this Court.").
99.
See Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368; see also Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex,
Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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development that would be in accord with contemporary patent theory
and good public policy.
III. SUPPORT FOR THE REVERSE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN
MODERN PATENT LAW THEORIES

It is a tried and true metaphor that the US patent system is a
quid pro quo between the public and the inventor. In exchange for the
inventor disclosing to the public a new invention, the public incurs the
competitive harm of granting the inventor a temporary monopoly. In
Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court wrote that "[t]he basic quid
pro quo ...

for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by

the public from an invention with substantial utility."100 The Court
has invoked this contractual metaphor in deciding numerous other
cases. 10 1 The quid pro quo metaphor is supported in the language of
the Constitution, which provides that Congress may grant patents and
0 2
copyrights "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'
But the Constitution does not state that patents may be granted solely
to promote "inventions"-rather, it is to promote something broader:
"the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' 10 3 The Supreme Court has
recognized explicitly that patent laws should foster not only invention,
but also innovation-even if only indirectly. Referring to the quid pro
quo in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Court wrote, "The
productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of
increased employment and better lives for our citizens."10 4 In other
words, the return the public should receive in exchange for the patent
grant is not only abstract specifications of inventions; the public
should also receive commercial products, increased employment, and
better lives.
As this author has argued elsewhere, modern patent law
theories, although they may disagree on many points, seem to agree
that the consideration society receives in exchange for the patent

100.
383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
101.
See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142
(2001) ('The disclosure required by the Patent Act is 'the quid pro quo of the right to exclude."')
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989) (referring to "the quidpro quo of substantial
creative effort required by the federal statute").
102.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
103.
Id. (emphasis added).
104.

Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480.
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grant should not be limited to claimed inventions. 10 5 Rather, the more
valuable types of consideration go beyond the patent claims and
consist of such things as: (1) further innovations created in an attempt
to design around the patent; (2) further innovations created by losers
in the "patent race"; (3) commercialization, product development, and
marketing required to turn an invention into an actual innovation;
(4) unclaimed scientific information contained in the patent document;
and (5) the signals patent portfolios give to investors regarding the
economic potential of start-ups and other companies. 10 6 Because these
indirect benefits caused by the patent system are not claimed as
' 07
inventions, they may be referred to as "unclaimed consideration."'
This Part begins by briefly summarizing this commonality
among four modern patent law theories: commercialization theory,
patent disclosure theory, patent race theory, and signaling theory
(also called "portfolio" theory). All four theories place primary value
on unclaimed consideration received in exchange for the patent grant,
rather than claimed inventions. Accordingly, all of these theories cry
for the patent laws to be reformed to make the regime more fertile
ground for the development of such "unclaimed consideration." The
Part then transitions to the argument that such patent reform may be
right under our noses: it is the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
A. CommercializationTheory
Commercialization theory recognizes the substantial value of
the effort, risk, creativity, and expense required to turn an idea or
invention into a feasible commercial product. 0 8 Ted Sichelman writes
that bringing a product to market is a "lengthy process," involving
many steps that are "fraught with uncertainty and great expense."'10 9
A working prototype must be developed; the product must be tested
and improved; for certain products, tests must be conducted to comply
with government regulations; the product must be market tested and
marketed; and the product must be manufactured, distributed, and
advertised. 110 This innovation activity is valuable consideration that
society should ideally receive in exchange for the patent grant.

105.
106.

See Ernst, supra note 4, at 11-24.
Id.

107.

Id.

108.
See Lemley, supra note 5, at 711 ("Commercialization theory ... hypothesizes that
.
we grant patents in order to encourage not invention but product development .
109.
Sichelman, supra note 3, at 348-54.
110.
See Chris Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
88-89 (2009) ('There is an enormous amount of technical and market information generated as
The process, hopefully
development proceeds towards the final goal of commercial sale ....
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However, the patent laws only require the description of an
invention, without any requirement to develop a commercial product
or even develop a working prototype.1 1 ' And because the majority of
patented inventions are never commercialized, 112 they create a "patent
thicket" that true innovators must navigate in order to produce a
practical, workable innovation for the benefit of the public. 13 Hence,
according to commercialization theory, the patent laws should be
reformed to encourage the development of innovations, not just
inventions." 4 As later discussed, a revitalized reverse doctrine of
15
equivalents is an ideal tool for achieving these goals."
B. Disclosure Theory
Modern disclosure
theory similarly values unclaimed
consideration received in exchange for the patent grant. According to
disclosure theory, an important function of the patent system is to
induce the disclosure of useful technical information, including
background and other technical information that is not claimed as an
invention. As Jeanne Fromer argues, these disclosures are valuable
because they can lead to further innovations beyond the patented
invention, "[T]he disclosure can stimulate others to design around the
invention or conceive of new inventions-either by improving upon the
invention or by being inspired by it--even during the patent term."" 6
Professor Dan L. Burk argues that unclaimed patent disclosures are
results in a commercialized product that is technologically feasible and best meets market
demand.").
111.
Sichelman, supra note 3, at 344 ("The upshot is that patent law confers direct
encouragement to inventors who create and disclose intangible specifications, but not necessarily
tangible products.").
112.
Id. at 362-64 (observing that the claims of less than half of all patents are ever
commercialized and only about 5 percent of patents are ever licensed for a royalty).
113.
Cotropia, supra note 110, at 112 ("This underdevelopment of patented
inventions... can have serious consequences because it can only hamper, as opposed to promote,
technological progress.").
114.
See, e.g., William Kingston, Innovation Needs Patents Reform, 30 RESEARCH POL'Y
403, 416 (2001) (proposing the creation of an "innovation warrant" to "protect[ ] innovation
directly, instead of indirectly..."); Sichelman, supra note 3, at 345 (proposing the creation of a
"commercialization patent" to be granted in return for "a commitment to commercialize a product
not available in the marketplace"); see also Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped
Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1109-20 (2007) (proposing auctions to reward to
bidders extended patent terms which would encourage the commercialization of the patented
inventions); Michael Abramowicz & John Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 401-02 (2008) (proposing restrictions on the claim
scope, status as prior art, and higher validity bars for uncommercialized patents); Cotropia,
supra note 110 at 119-20 (proposing that patentees must reduce their inventions to practice
prior to patenting).
115.
See infra Section III.E.
116.
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548-49 (2009).
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useful for recording and codifying industrial knowledge that would not
otherwise be published. 117 These unclaimed patent disclosures spur
further innovations by allowing new companies to learn essential
industrial knowledge.
Critics of disclosure theory maintain that researchers do not
read patents in conducting their research. 118 But Professor Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette has conducted research to refute this supposition.
Her survey of nanotechnologists revealed that some 64 percent of
respondents consulted patents in conducting their research. 11 9
Moreover, it is not the patented inventions that researchers primarily
find useful in reading patents; instead, it is background information
and technical details that help inform their own research. 120 Indeed,
the patent claims are the least useful portion of the patent to
researchers, because "the majority of them believe that patents do not
enable a skilled researcher to reproduce the invention.''
Accordingly, disclosure theory posits that the patent disclosure
provides valuable consideration to society in exchange for the patent
grant beyond the value of the claimed inventions. This is not only so
that the public can make the patented inventions after the expiration
of the patent; disclosure, more importantly, inspires further
innovations and market entries unrelated to the claimed inventions.
Disclosure theorists argue that patent disclosure requirements should
be reformed to more usefully perform this function.1 22 As later
discussed, safeguarding the unclaimed consideration that patent
disclosure theory values can be achieved through a revitalized reverse
23
doctrine of equivalents.
C. Patent Race Theory
Patent race theory is premised on the fact that most successful
innovations are developed as the result of many different researchers

Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY
117.
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1011, 1027, 1032 (2008).
See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The MisunderstoodFunction of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
118.
HARV.J.L. & TECH. 401, 405 (2010); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L.
REV. 123, 148 (2006).
119.
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 -ARV. J.L. &
TECH. 531, 534 (2012).

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 564.
See, e.g. Fromer, supra note 116, at 593-96.
See infra Section HI.E.
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competing to solve the same problem. 124 Accordingly, patent races (or
more accurately, "innovation races") do not result in wasteful,
duplicative efforts, as maintained by prospect theory.' 25 Rather,
innovation races are necessary to the creation of successful
inventions. 126 More importantly, however, is the valuable unclaimed
consideration that society receives as the result of patent races. The
"losers" in a patent race often develop other innovations, different
from the "winner's" patented invention. 127 In addition, patent races
inspire researchers to work faster, which results in more rapid
innovation and the earlier expiration of patents. 128 Indeed, Professor
Jean Tirole argues that "[i]t would thus be desirable to formalize
successive patent races." 129

In other words, patent races are so

socially beneficial that Professor Tirole contends they should be
formalized in the law. Patent races have social utility because they
inspire the creation of "unclaimed consideration" beyond the value of
claimed inventions. The reverse doctrine of equivalents can guard
130
such unclaimed consideration.
D. Patent Signaling Theory

Patent signaling theory is grounded in practical realism:
companies seek patents primarily because of the signals they give to
potential investors, not in order to preserve the exclusive right to
make the patented inventions. 131 Patents are a credible way for a
company to convey information about itself because they bear the
stamp of approval of a government agency-the US Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO)-and are submitted under a duty of
Patents are an efficient way to convey
candor to USPTO. 13 2

124.
See Lemley, supra note 5, at 712-33 (demonstrating that "[t]he overwhelming
majority of inventions, including the overwhelming majority of so-called 'pioneering' inventions,
are in fact developed by individuals or groups working independently at roughly the same time").
See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
125.
& ECON. 265, 271 (1977) ("Subsequent investigation of the same prospect by other firms can
neither build on the knowledge obtained by the first searcher nor determine the efficient level
and strategy of search based upon his failure.').
Lemley, supra note 5, at 712-33.
126.
127.
See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 400 ('The loser of a
patent race does not always lose everything; sometimes it comes up with a patent for another
product (or else with more experience for the patent race).").
128.
Lemley, supra note 5, at 753.
129.
TIROLE, supra note 127.
See infra Section III.E.
130.
131.
See Holbrook, supra note 118, at 131-36 (2006).
132.
Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 649 (2002). The US Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) regulations provide, in pertinent part, "Each individual
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good

2016]

REVERSE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

493

information to investors because it costs less for companies to convey
information about themselves in government-certified documents than
it would cost for investors to painstakingly gather the information
133
themselves.
But the bulk of particularly useful information that patents
convey to investors has little to do with the claimed inventions.
Indeed, it would be highly inefficient for investors to attempt to
understand and assess the potential value of each of the claimed
inventions in a large patent portfolio.' 34 Rather, a high number of
patents indicate first to investors that the company has resources to
invest in research, development, and patent prosecution. 135 Second,
patents indicate generally the areas of research in which the company
is engaged and the prior art research of other companies that the
investment target pays attention to. 136 Finally, one might add that
even established companies often obtain patent portfolios primarily
because of their signals-to warn competitors not to sue for patent
37
infringement, lest they take the risk of being countersued. 1
Fundamentally, patent signaling theory, like the other theories
discussed earlier, recognizes that the primary value patents provide to
society is not the ultimate ability to practice claimed inventions at the
end of the patent term, but unclaimed consideration-here, an
efficient and credible system of conveying information to investors
about investment targets. The reverse doctrine of equivalents can
advance the goal of patent signaling theory to ensure that the patent
system guards this unclaimed consideration without creating a burden
138
on innovation.

faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information
known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section." 37 C.F.R. §
1.56 (2016).
133.
Long, supra note 132, at 644.
134.
See Holbrook, supra note 118, at 138 ("The disclosure of any single patent is likely
irrelevant in market signaling theory because evaluating the contents of the patent for accuracy
would greatly increase costs, undermining the efficiency gains of the signal.").
135.
Long, supra note 132, at 647.
136.
Id.
137.
See, e.g., James Niccolai, Are Motorola's Patents Enough to Protect Android?, P.C.
WORLD (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/articlel238129/are-motorolaspatents-enough

to-protect android_.html [https://perma.cc/88DT-RV53] (speculating that Google purchased
Motorola's $1.25 billion patent portfolio because it "should help shield Google and its partners
from future legal action...").
138.
See infra Section III.E.
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E. The Patent Reform Under Our Noses: The Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents
In short, there is a growing theoretical consensus that the
patent laws should foster "Progress" broadly defined as something
beyond the value of claimed inventions: actual innovations for the
benefit of the public, which spring from commercialization efforts;
unclaimed technical disclosures that facilitate new market entries and
further innovations; patent races that lead to innovations other than
the "winners"' claimed inventions; attempts to design around patents,
which lead to further innovations; credible and efficient signals that
of other activities wholly
patent portfolios give to investors; and a host
139
inventions.
claimed
actual
the
to
unrelated
But the facts on the ground reveal that the patent system often
acts perversely to impede the flowering of this unclaimed
consideration. Litigation imposes a tremendous tax on commercial
innovations, 140 particularly when the asserted patents have not
themselves been commercialized-as is true for the majority of
patents. 141 Although commercialization theory thus recognizes that
realized innovations are more valuable to society than abstract
invention specifications, the patent system foolishly allows
uncommercialized patents to impose a heavy tax on such innovations.
Although patent disclosure theory recognizes that researchers find the
background information about industries and technology in patents
more valuable than the claimed inventions, the patent systems allows
the claimed inventions to squelch the new market entries and
innovations that would otherwise be made possible by these patent
disclosures. 42 Although patent race theory recognizes that the
innovations developed by "losers" in the patent race are often more
valuable than the "winners"' claimed inventions, the patent system
allows those claimed inventions to impede and tax the innovations
developed by the patent race losers. 143 Although the information
about investment targets that patent counts give to investors is more
valuable than any particular claimed inventions therein, the patent

See supra Sections III.A-D.
139.
See Bessen & Maurer, supra note 9, at 408 (noting that non-practicing patent
140.
assertion entities imposed litigation costs on defendants of $29 billion in 2011).
Sichelman, supra note 3, at 362-64.
141.
See supra Section I.A.
142.
See id. A patent gives the inventor the right to exclude any innovation that falls
143.
within the claims of the patent, even if it improves upon the patented invention. See CRAIG
ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 457 (2d ed. 2011). Accordingly, absent the reverse doctrine of
equivalents, the patent law can allow an innovation developed by a patent race loser to be
ensnared by a patent even if it substantially improves upon the patented invention.
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system allows the uncommercialized claimed inventions of patent
trolls to raise the risk for investors and to impede those very start-up
companies. 144
But while patent reforms wallow in Congress, there is a patent
reform to address the problem readily at hand: the reverse doctrine of
equivalents. The reverse doctrine of equivalents is an ideal vehicle for
protecting true innovations from the thicket of patent claims because
of its "wholesale realism."1 45 When confronted, for example, with a
non-practicing entity that can semantically ensnare a true innovation
within the literal words of its patent claim, the court may consider
whether infringement is avoided by the reverse doctrine of
equivalents.
Application of the reverse doctrine of equivalents requires, of
course, a determination of whether the accused product is so
substantially different from the patented invention as to change the
principal of the invention, despite the ability to demonstrate literal (or
semantic) infringement. 146 But as is revealed in the "lost precedent" of
the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the court may also consider the
question "from a practical and commercial point of view.' 1 47 In the
Boyden case itself, the court decided to favor the accused device
because it solved the problem in the art, whereas the patent holder's
product "did not prove to be a success ....
In the circumstance where the patent holder makes no
commercial product at all, as in the case of a patent troll, the case for
applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents is even stronger. Like the
District of New Jersey's decision in General Electric v. Allis-Chalmers
Co., the court may consider that "[t]he complainant's patent has never
been used to any considerable extent"; whereas "[o]n the contrary, the
defendant's device has provided a successful notch-to-notch
movement .... ,,149 In other words, the court, when determining
noninfringement, takes into account that the defendant has not

144.
Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing, & Sara Jeruss, The AA 500 Expanded: The Effects of
Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 (2013) (observing that non-practicing
entities filed 58.7 percent of the patent infringement lawsuits in 2012 and frequently target
startup companies in the Internet and technology sectors).
145.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
146.
Id. at 608-09; see also Allis-Chalmers Co., 171 F. at 669 ("Infringement is not a
mere matter of words.").
147.
Severy Process Co., 113 F. at 583; see supra Section II.B.
148.
Boyden Power-Brake, 170 U.S. at 572.
149.
Allis-Chalmers Co., 171 F. at 670; see also Cadwell, 13 F.2d at 489 ("Defendant has
produced and marketed in quantities the tire of which complaint is made, while so far as I can
find from the record, no tires constructed in accordance with the patent in suit have ever been
manufactured ... ").
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practiced its patent to any great success-thus not providing society
with a useful innovation.
In this way, an invigorated reverse doctrine of equivalents
could help to assure that the patent system promotes "the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,"150 not merely abstract inventions. This
enhancement would be achieved on a case-by-case basis, with the
court taking into consideration the relative equities of the parties.
Such a solution would address the problem of patent trolls but would
also temper the fear of opponents of legislative patent reform that
broad prospective legislation could have an unforeseen harmful impact
on innovation generally. 15' It is not possible to predict with certainty
whether a revitalized reverse doctrine of equivalents would have a
negative impact on the incentive to invent or to quantify any such
impact the doctrine might have. But a judge-made doctrine applied on
a case-by-case basis that weighs the relative value of each individual
litigant's contribution to society is a far more cautious way to proceed
than broad prospective patent reform litigation. There is no evidence
that the reverse doctrine of equivalents discouraged innovation
between 1898 and 1988, the years when it was in active use. These
years saw the development of revolutionary innovations, from the
airplane 52 to the incandescent light bulb 53 to the Internet. The
regular use of the reverse doctrine of equivalents does not appear to
have squelched these innovations.
IV. REFORMING AND REFINING THE REVERSE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS

Hence, the reverse doctrine of equivalents
invigorated to serve as a tool to protect the valuable
consideration society receives in exchange for the patent
the thicket of uncommercialized patented inventions.

should be
unclaimed
grant from
This Part

U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl.8.
150.
151.
See, e.g., Press Release, Biotech. Indus. Org., BIO Opposes H.R. 9, the Innovation
Act (June 11, 2015) ("BIO consistently has urged Congress to proceed cautiously when
addressing any changes to the patent system that could unduly shift the legal balance against
https://www.bio.org/media/press-releasebio-opposes-hr-9owners."),
patent
legitimate
innovation-act [https://perma.cc/57GF-FBGG1; Press Release, Higher Educ. Ass'n, Statement on
Scheduled House Judiciary Committee Markup of Innovation Act (H.R.9) (June 10, 2015) ("H.R.
9 is not targeted to address the small minority of patent holders that are abusing the system.
Rather the bill would weaken the entire patent system."), http://www.aplu.org/news-andmediaINews/higher-education-association-statement-on-scheduled-house-judiciary-committeemarkup-of-innovation-act-hr-9 [https://perma.cc/9FHY-4YCTI.
152.
See Flying Mach., U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (filed Mar. 23, 1903) (issued May 22,
1906).
See Lemley, supra note 5, at 722-23 (discussing Thomas Edison's development of
153.
the incandescent light in the early 1900s).
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explores how the doctrine might be reformed to make it more
acceptable to the courts.
A. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Should Apply to Substantial
Improvements, Not Just Radical Improvements
Other scholars agree that the reverse doctrine of equivalents
should play a more important role in the patent regime than it does
under current law. Professor Robert Merges argues that the doctrine
could break the bargaining deadlock between holders of pioneer
patents and parties who develop key improvements on the patented
technology. 154 Bargaining deadlock occurs when the holder of an
earlier patent and an innovator of an improvement on that patent fail
to agree to a cross-license, thereby depriving society of the
improvement to the patented invention.15 5 Under such circumstances,
the reverse doctrine of equivalents would ideally "serve[ ] as a judicial
'safety valve,' releasing pressure that builds up when pioneers and
improvers fail to agree to a license. ' 156 Without the pressure that a
credible reverse doctrine of equivalents would put on the pioneer
patent holder to grant a license, "[t]here is a possibility in these cases
that the wonderfully effective improvement developed by the improver
will be kept off the market until the pioneer's patent expires."'157 But
if Professor Merges is correct that the doctrine can serve society by
protecting radical improvements against pioneer patents, then that is
all the more reason why it should also protect such improvements
against the more mundane, uncommercialized patents held by patent
trolls.
Mark Lemley has observed that there are three different
classes of infringers who improve on patented inventions: minor
improvers, significant improvers, and radical improvers.15 8 Under the
current patent regime, parties who make only minor improvements to
a patented invention do not escape infringement. 59 They either
literally infringe the patent because they merely add minor features to
the claimed invention or they are ensnared by the doctrine of
equivalents because their improvements are insubstantial. This is the
correct result, because, as the Supreme Court recognized in Graver
Tank, to arrive at a different outcome would be "to convert the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Merges, supra note 18, at 75.

159.

Id. at 1007-08.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Lemley, supra note 18, at 1007-13.
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protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing."'160
Significant improvers may also infringe the patent, but they may be
able to separately patent their improvement, in which case they may
be able to leverage a cross-license with the patent holder so that the
patent holder may also incorporate the improvement-the
phenomenon of "blocking patents."'16 1 Radical improvers, on the other
hand, may be able to escape liability altogether under the reverse
doctrine of equivalents.' 62
"The reverse doctrine of equivalents
therefore benefits radical improvers at the expense of the original
patentee, and so encourages radical improvements, just as the
blocking patents rule provides some lesser encouragement to
' 63
significant improvements."'
But there is no cause to limit the doctrine to "radical
improvements." As discussed earlier, nothing in Boyden, Graver
Tank, or any of the "lost precedent" in between those cases and the
death of the doctrine suggest that it is limited to "radical
improvers."' 64 Rather, the pre-Federal Circuit precedent excuses
infringement for products that are "substantially" changed in
principle-seemingly
Professor Lemley's
second,
intermediate
16
5
category.
This makes sense because the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is nothing more than the doctrine of equivalents operating
in favor of the accused infringer instead of the patent holder. 166 The
doctrine of equivalents tests whether the accused product is
"substantially" the same as the patented product despite literal
infringement.' 67 Hence, the reverse doctrine of equivalents should test
whether the accused product is "substantially" different from the
patented product despite literal infringement. There is no reason to
make the doctrine of equivalents liberal and commonplace when it is
applied to benefit patent holders, but extreme, arcane, and
extraordinary when applied to benefit accused infringers.

160.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 606.
161.
Lemley, supra note 18, at 1009-10.
162.
Id. at 1012.
163.
Id. at 1012-13. Unfortunately, even in the case of radical improvements, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents is, under current Federal Circuit law, a dead letter. Id. at 1657 ("The
doctrine is rarely applied, and a recent Federal Circuit decision casts doubt on its future.") (citing
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368).
164.
See supra Section II.D.
165.
See id.
166.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 ('The doctrine operates not only in favor of the
patentee of a pioneer or primary invention, but also for the patentee of a secondary invention
consisting of a combination of old ingredients which produce new and useful results.").
167.
Id. ("[A] patentee may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a
device 'if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result."') (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
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This distinction is not merely a matter of semantics or
symmetry. If modern patent theory demonstrates that the more
valuable consideration society receives in return for the patent grant
are
improvements,
design-arounds,
and
other
unclaimed
consideration,' 68 then the patent system should allow for society to
receive the benefit of these substantial improvements, not merely
radical improvements.
The patent system should not lock this
powerful weapon away only to be brought out in the case of radical
improvements.
Moreover, the phenomenon of blocking patents provides small
comfort to innovators who produce substantial improvements. The
blocking patents doctrine is a phenomenon resulting from the fact that
a party that literally practices each of the limitations of a claimed
invention generally does not avoid infringement by adding additional
features. 169 The infringing improvement may be sufficiently novel and
non-obvious that it qualifies for a patent in its own right.' 70 The
owner of the improvement patent is still unable to practice her
improvement because it will still infringe the first patent, even though
it adds additional features. 171 But the owner of the first patent is also
prevented from practicing the second, improvement patent. 172 The
patents block each other and unless the parties agree to a
cross-license, the public will be deprived of the benefit of the
improvement patent. As Professor Merges has observed, the two
parties unfortunately are often locked in bargaining breakdown,
unable to arrive at an agreement. 173 Professor Merges argues that if
the improvement patent is a "radical improvement," then the reverse
doctrine of equivalents should excuse infringement and thereby break
74
the bargaining breakdown to the benefit of society. 1
But why should the reverse doctrine of equivalents only relieve
"radical" improvers
of infringement liability
under these
circumstances? Why should the doctrine not relieve "substantial"
improvers as well? After all, substantial improvers are just as likely
(indeed, far more likely) to find themselves locked in the bargaining
breakdown Professor Merges refers to than are radical improvers; one
would assume the patent holder would be far more eager to license a
patented radical improvement than a substantial improvement. More
168.
See supra Sections III.A-D.
169.
NARD, supra note 143, at 457 ("Literal infringement cannot be avoided if the
accused device contains additional elements not found in the claim.").
170.
JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 18 (4th ed. 2013).
171.
Id. at 19.
172.
Id.
173.
Merges, supra note 18, at 75.
174.
Id. at 79.
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importantly, non-practicing entities are wholly immune from the
blocking patents doctrine, because they produce no product and are
therefore unmoved by any pressure to license the improvement patent.
Particularly in the case of patent trolls, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents thus should adhere to the benefit of substantial
improvers, not just radical improvers.
B. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Should Excuse Equivalent
Infringement as well as Literal Infringement
For that matter, there is no rationale why the reverse doctrine
of equivalents should excuse infringement only for products that fall
within the literal scope of the claims. Under current Federal Circuit
precedent, 'lt]he reverse doctrine of equivalents comes into
consideration only when literal infringement is apparent. [If the
asserted patent] claims are not literally infringed, the reverse doctrine
of equivalents does not apply.' 75 But why should a doctrine that is
critical to protecting substantial improvements favor accused products
that fall within the literal scope of the claims more than those that
only infringe by equivalents? For example, if the asserted patent
claim contains limitations A, B, and C, the accused product may
escape infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents if it
meets all three limitations literally but adds a radical improvement.
Yet, if the same radical improvement meets only limitations A and B
of the asserted patent, substituting an equivalent structure for
limitation C, it is not eligible for the protection of the reverse doctrine
of equivalents because there is no literal infringement, even if it too
contains the radical improvement. 176 Such a regime gives more
protection to literal infringers than it does to equivalent infringers
and makes no sense in logic or in policy. This is particularly true if
the patent holder does not practice its patent and the equivalently
infringing improvement represents the solution that allows for a
commercially practical invention. In such cases, the court should be
able to use the reverse doctrine of equivalents to excuse infringement
and allow for society to receive the accused innovation free of the tax
imposed by the paper patent.

175.
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
176.
Nor would the radical improvement necessarily evade infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents because the Federal Circuit has recently held that even a separately
patentable invention that the USPTO judged to be non-obvious over the asserted patent may not
escape infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Siemens Medical Solutions v.
Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, 637 F.3d 1269, 1280-81 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'gen banc denied,
647 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2679 (May 29, 2012).
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C. The Test for the Reverse Doctrineof Equivalents Should Be
Formalizedand Reformed
If the reverse doctrine of equivalents is the patent reform we
are seeking to protect innovation from abstract inventions, why has it
landed in the dustbin of legal doctrines? Why does the Federal Circuit
disfavor a doctrine that not only enjoyed a long pedigree in the case
law prior to that court's creation, but also has earned the admiration
of prominent scholars?
Professors Burk and Lemley suggest that the Federal Circuit
has "effectively rejected the reverse doctrine of equivalents" out of "a
resistance to the use of policy levers. ' 177 A "policy lever" is a "flexible
legal standard" that gives courts the freedom to "adapt the patent
statute to evolving technologies.' 178
The reverse doctrine of
equivalents is certainly a policy lever, whether it is viewed as a tool to
protect "unclaimed consideration," as described in this Article; a tool
to prevent bargaining breakdown, as Professor Merges suggests; 179 or
a tool to encourage radical improvers, as Professor Lemley observes. 80
The Federal Circuit does not prefer policy measures, according to
Professors Burk, Lemley, and other scholars; they instead favor
"simple rules and legal formalism."1'8 An illuminating example of the
Federal Circuit's attraction to defined legal standards was the court's
adoption of the "machine or transformation test" as the exclusive test
to determine the patent eligibility of abstract ideas. This standard
was rejected by the Supreme Court as the exclusive test and replaced
with no definite standard at all. 8 2 Another example of Federal Circuit
formalism was the requirement that accused infringers identify a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art references in
order to prove that a patented invention would have been obvious. 18 3
The Supreme Court rejected this rule on the basis that "a court errs
where, as here, it transforms general principle into a rigid rule
limiting the obviousness inquiry."'1 4
177.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 35, at 1672.
178.
Id. at 1579.
179.
See Merges, supra note 18, at 75.
180.
See Lemley, supra note 18, at 1012-13.
181.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 35, at 1673 (citing Thomas, supra note 35).
182.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) ("The machine-or-transformation test
is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible "process."); Timothy B.
Dyk & Samuel F. Ernst, Patents, in BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
§ 86:42 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2011) ("In its stead, the Supreme Court offered no real
substitute test 'beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in [35 U.S.C.] § 100(b) and
looking to the guideposts in [the Court's prior precedent]."') (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612).
183.
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007).
184.
Id.
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It is natural for the Federal Circuit to prefer formal and
predictable rules to discretionary policy levers. As Judge Meyer has
written, "This court was created for the purpose of bringing
consistency to the patent field." 185 But this Article does not debate
here whether discretionary policy levers are preferable to legal
formalism. 186 Instead, this Article's practical task is to salvage the
reverse doctrine of equivalents so that it can serve to protect
If providing the doctrine with a more
unclaimed consideration.
certain legal test will make it more attractive to judges, then that is
what must be done. In other words, it is possible to formulate a
well-defined legal standard that also implements policy.
Importantly, the doctrine of equivalents itself implements
policy. The Supreme Court states that the doctrine of equivalents was
developed because the courts did not want "to convert the protection of
the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing"; the courts do not
want to "deprive [the inventor] of the benefit of his invention and...
foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one
of the primary purposes of the patent system." 187 Those are specific,
articulable policies. A rule to encourage radical improvements is no
less a policy than is a rule to encourage the disclosure of
inventions-both are policies to "promote Progress," only in different
ways. 188 And despite the original policy impetus of the doctrine of
equivalents, the Federal Circuit has never been shy about applying
that doctrine to establish infringement, using the legal standard of the
tripartite test. The tripartite test provides that an accused product
infringes by equivalents if it performs substantially the same function
in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same
result.189
As currently formulated, the test for the reverse doctrine of
equivalents does not pass muster as a bright line rule. The court is
tasked with determining if the accused device "is so far changed in
principal from a patented article that it performs the same or a
similar function in a substantially different way."1 90 As Stephen M.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1330 (en banc) (Meyer, C.J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP.
185.
NO. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981)).
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 35, at n. 377, to read about this debate; Burk &
186.
Lemley note that R. Polk Wagner "defends the Federal Circuit's shift to formal rules on the
grounds that they provide greater certainty" and argue that they "do not agree with Wagner that
the certainty that will be gained by eliminating policy levers is worth the cost to innovation that
poorly tailored incentives provide." See also R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent
Administration and the Failureof Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 234-37 (2002)).
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
187.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
188.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
189.
Id.
190.
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Maurer points out, "Left unsaid was how much change would be
required to trigger the test."19 1 Even more troubling is the mysterious
concept of the "principal" of the invention; how is one to cope with that
metaphysical concept?
The Federal Circuit teaches that "[t]he
'principal' or 'equitable scope of the claims' of the patented invention is
determined in light of the specification, prosecution history, and the
prior art."192 But how is that analysis different from ordinary claim
construction, under which courts interpret the actual (and not
"equitable") scope of the claims in light of that same intrinsic
evidence? 193
More importantly, once the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is reduced to limiting the equitable scope of the claims in
light of the specification, then it really does become redundant of the
Section 112 analysis. 94 This is troubling because it leads down the
rabbit-hole of Mead, in which the court concluded that "when
Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, after the decision in Graver Tank, it
imposed requirements for the written description, enablement,
definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive
with the broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents." 195 If the reverse doctrine equivalents does nothing more
than limit the claims in light of the specification, then it may very well
be obviated by Section 112. But, as argued earlier, the lost precedent
of the reverse doctrine of equivalents largely does not engage in this
type of Section 112 analysis. Rather than measuring the claims of the
patent against the principle of the invention as set forth in the
specification, the lost precedent weighs the relative technological and
commercial merits of the patented invention and the substantially
96
improved commercial product. 1
A test is therefore required that better implements the policy
goal of protecting valuable innovations from the snares of
uncommercialized patent claims in concrete, well-defined steps:
1. As a first step, the court should compare the claims (and not
the "principle") of the patent to the accused product. Despite literal
(or even equivalent) infringement, does the accused product add
something to the patent claims or modify the claims such that it
constitutes a substantial technological improvement on the claimed
invention? This is different from ordinary infringement analysis
191.
Maurer, supra note 40, at 687.
192.
Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc. 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
193.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1314-17 (referencing that the court should construe the
claims in light of the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history).
194.
See supra Section II.E.
195.
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368.
196.
See supra Section II.B.
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because the court can take account of the additional features the
accused product adds to the claims of the patented invention and
technological
assess whether they represent a substantial
Nor is this exercise redundant of a Section 112
improvement.
analysis, because the court is not asking whether the claims of the
asserted patent are enabled or supported by a written description.
Rather, the court is asking whether the accused product adds
something to the fully enabled patent claims that represents a
substantial technological improvement on those claims.
2. If the court concludes that the accused product is a
substantial technological improvement on the patented invention, the
court should proceed to weighing the accused product's commercial
success. In step 2, the court should compare the accused product to
any embodiment of the patented invention (made by a licensee or the
patent-holder itself). Does the accused product enjoy substantially
superior commercial success as compared to the patent holder's
product?
3. A third step should be introduced to ameliorate the concern
that the doctrine would unfairly advantage large companies with more
resources to successfully commercialize a product over smaller
inventors. Hence, the court should require that the accused infringer
prove that there is a nexus between the superior commercial success
and the technological superiority of the accused product. In other
words, the accused infringer must demonstrate that the commercial
success is not due to marketing, advertising, brand recognition, or
other factors unrelated to the technological superiority of the accused
product. Such proof is not foreign to patent law. In demonstrating
commercial success as a secondary consideration in support of nonobviousness, the patent holder must prove the same nexus between
commercial success and the technological merit of the patented
invention. 197
If all three elements are proven, then there is a situation where
a technologically and commercially superior substantial improvement
on the patented invention is in danger of being ensnared by patent
claims that are significantly less valuable to society. In such a case,
the reverse doctrine of equivalents can be used to preserve to society
the more valuable consideration received in exchange for the patent
grant and promote "Progress," rather than mere invention.
Nor is this test invented out of whole cloth. It is firmly
grounded in the pre-Graver Tank precedent. Hence, the Court in
197.
Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Evidence
of commercial success, or other secondary considerations, is only significant if there is a nexus
between the claimed invention and the commercial success.").
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Boyden compared the accused train brakes to the claimed invention
and found a substantial difference. 198 The accused product was
substantially technologically superior because "it solved at once, in the
simplest manner, the problem of quick action." 199 The Court then
compared the accused product to Westinghouse's embodiment of its
patent and concluded that it was not only technologically superior, but
also commercially more successful than the Westinghouse product.
Whereas the patent holder's product did "not seem to have been
entirely successful in its practical operation," and whereas a better
solution "was sought after by inventors and car builders," only the
defendant "discovered that it could be done by this mode of
operation. '20 0 Accordingly, the Court was "induced to look with more
favor upon [the accused] device. ' 20 1 As discussed earlier, the other
decisions in the "lost precedent" similarly take into account
substantial technological improvement and superior commercial
202
success.
Hence, by returning the reverse doctrine of equivalents to its
pre-Graver Tank origins, society could recover an invaluable tool for
protecting true innovation from mere invention. And the legal system
could do so carefully, and on a case-by-case basis, without unwittingly
disturbing the innovation ecosystem. That is the common-law patent
reform that lays ready at hand as the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
V. CONCLUSION

Proponents of patent reform legislation argue that the current
patent system acts perversely to hinder true innovation in the name of
abstract specifications of inventions, which are never commercialized.
Opponents of such legislation argue that comprehensive, prospective
legislation could have unforeseen harmful consequences that could, in
fact, cripple innovation. Perhaps the solution lies not in legislation,
but in a common law doctrine lying right under our noses-the reverse
doctrine of equivalents. Properly applied, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents can serve to protect true innovation from patent thickets
by excusing infringement when the defendant's product is
substantially superior to the plaintiffs embodiment of the patented
invention, both technologically and commercially. In order to avoid
giving an unfair advantage to large companies, the accused infringer

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Boyden Power-Brake, 170 U.S. at 570.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 572.
See supra Section II.B.
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should be required to demonstrate that there is a nexus between the
accused product's superior commercial success and its superior
technological merit. Such a test need not be created out of whole
cloth; it can be found in the pre-Federal Circuit precedent applying the
doctrine of Boyden v. Westinghouse: the lost precedent of the reverse
doctrine of equivalents.

